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THE FAMILY OF STABLE MODELS 
MELVIN FITTING 
D The family of all stable models for a logic program has a surprisingly 
simple overall structure, once two naturally occurring orderings are made 
explicit. In a so-called knowledge ordering based on degree of definedness, 
every logic program 9 has a smallest stable model $--it is the well- 
founded model. There is also a dual largest stable model S$, which has 
not been considered before. There is another ordering based on degree of 
truth. Taking the meet and the join, in the truth ordering, of the two 
extreme stable models s$ and S$ just mentioned yields the alternating 
fixed points of Van Gelder, denoted s$ and S,$ here. From s$ and S$ in 
turn, s$ and S$ can be produced again, using the meet and joint of the 
knowledge ordering. All stable models are bounded by these four valua- 
tions. Further, the methods of proof apply not just to logic programs 
considered classically, but to logic programs over any bilattice meeting 
certain conditions, and thus apply in a vast range of settings. The methods 
of proof are largely algebraic. a 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Stable model semantics [17, 61 and well-founded model semantics [30, 311 have 
provided valuable insights on the meaning of logic programs. While much is known 
about these semantics, it has not been made clear just how elegant a structure the 
family of stable models has. The delineation of this structure is the primary aim of 
this paper. We do not attempt to state our results rigorously at this point, but wait 
until Section 9, after appropriate terminology and concepts have been introduced. 
We can give the general flavor, however. 
As originally formulated, stable model semantics was classical, two-valued. 
Under these circumstances not every program has a stable model. Three-valued, or 
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partial, model semantics has had an extensive development for logic programs 
generally [7, 20, 211. Soon Przymusinski extended the notion of stable model to 
allow three-valued, or partial, stable models, [22, 231, and showed every program 
has at least one partial stable model, and the well-founded model is the smallest 
among them, in a natural ordering [24]. Once one has made the transition from 
classical to partial models allowing incomplete information, it is a small step also to 
allow models admitting inconsistent information. Doing so provides a natural 
framework for the semantic understanding of logic programs that are distributed 
over several sites, with possibly conflicting information coming from different 
places [lo]. We make the extension to such a setting in this paper, as part of a 
much more general investigation. 
One can formally think of allowing incompleteness or inconsistency of informa- 
tion in logic programs in the following way. Take a valuation to be a mapping from 
ground atoms to sets of truth values. The values {tnre) and {false} correspond to the 
usual notions of truth and falsity, while 0 and {false, true) correspond to no 
information and inconsistent information, respectively. These are the four truth 
values of a logic due to Belnap [3], one that contains the KIeene strong three-val- 
ued logic as a sublogic. Now the space of valuations has two natural orderings. One 
is on the “degree of truth.” In this ordering an increase means that one or more 
ground atoms loses an assignment of false or gains an assignment of true. The 
other ordering is on the “degree of knowledge.” In this ordering an increase means 
at least one ground atom gains an assignment of true or false that it did not have, 
without losing any value it did have. As we will see, these two orderings are 
intimately connected. Now, we will show that the family of stable models for a 
program is bounded from above and below, in the knowledge ordering, by a biggest 
and a smallest stable model. The smallest is the well-founded model; this is 
Przymusinski’s result. The existence of a largest stable model is new and could not 
have been formulated without moving to the setting of Belnap’s logic. Also, the 
family of stable models is bounded from above and below in the truth ordering by 
two valuations that are not necessarily stable models themselves, but which are 
extremal in a certain sense. This, essentially, is the “alternating tixpoint construc- 
tion” of Van Gelder [29]. Finally, we will show that the smallest and biggest stable 
models in the knowledge ordering and the extremal valuations in the truth 
ordering are closely connected, and that they can be “calculated” from each other. 
This is new. 
The results just sketched actually hold in a much broader setting than was 
indicated. Establishing them in this broader setting takes no more work than it 
does in the classical context. In addition, working in the extended context tends to 
strip away some of the unnecessary detail and makes the underlying simplicity of 
the proofs stand out. We briefly outline the setting we have in mind. 
The four-valued logic of Belnap is the simplest example of a nontrivial biluttice, 
a notion introduced by Matt Ginsberg in [19]. We have made use of bilattices in 
previous work on the semantics of logic programming [ll-131, and once again we 
find them the proper tool. Motivation will be supplied in more detail in Section 4. 
For now, we merely remark that bilattices arise naturally in two ways, which we 
sketch briefly. 
First, instead of the all-or-nothing approach of classical logic, we might intro- 
duce a more general notion of evidence, such as a confidence factor. Then, further, 
we might separate the roles of positive and negative evidence. This leads directly to 
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bilattices and is the approach presented in [ll] and [12]. From this point of view, 
classical logic programming is based on there being only two kinds of evidence: 
totally convincing and totally unconvincing. 
Alternatively, we might think of the underlying logic as being more general than 
two-valued. For instance, if we have a program divided among two sites, then an 
answer to a ground query should contain information on which sites answer yes, 
and so there are four natural truth values: neither, one, the other, both. We might 
even allow dependencies between sites. This gives rise to an algebraic structure of 
truth values 125, 151. If, further, we admit the possibility of incomplete or inconsis- 
tent information about the behavior of these sites, we once again get the structure 
of a bilattice [14]. A summary of this and the previous approach will be presented 
in Section 4. 
The work in this paper extends results previously presented in [13]. At the time 
the earlier paper was written, the real simplicity of the structure of stable models 
had not become clear; hence the need for this fuller presentation. We remark 
again that moving from the classical setting to that of bilattices adds no complica- 
tions. Indeed, we believe it makes the underlying simplicity of the results stand out 
by removing unessential details. 
2. BELNAP’S LOGIC, .93W9 
In [3], Belnap introduced a logic intended to deal in a useful way with inconsistent 
or incomplete information. It is the simplest example of a nontrivial bilattice and it 
illustrates many of the basic ideas concerning them. In the next section we present 
the general notion of bilattice; in the following one we show there are lots of them 
and they arise in natural ways. In fact, Belnap’s logic is a good enough representa- 
tive of the whole family that, if you wish, on a first reading of this paper you could 
skip from the end of this section directly to Section 5, just assuming that every 
bilattice discussed is sufficiently like the Belnap one. 
We can think of Belnap’s values as sets of ordinary truth values. Suppose we 
write, simply, true for {true} and false for {false}. Also we write I for 0 and think 
of it as indicating a lack of information; we write T for {false, true} and think of it 
as indicating inconsistency. 
The truth values of Belnap’s logic have two natural orderings. One is the subset 
relation. For instance, I = 0 c {false) = false. If A c B, in a natural sense B 
represents more information than A, so this is referred to as a knowledge ordering 
and is denoted by sk . Thus I sk false. The other ordering is on the degree of 
truth and is denoted st . Here A I, B if “B is at least as true as A is, and A is at 
least as false as B is.” More precisely, A st B if A 17 {true) c B n {true} and 
B CT {false} SA n {false). Under this ordering, false I, I . The two orderings are 
represented in the double Hasse diagram shown in Figure 1. 
Both sk and sr give 9&YY9 a lattice structure. Meet and join under st are 
denoted A and V; they are natural generalizations of the usual conjunction and 
disjunction notions. Meet and join under sk are denoted Q and GJ ; x C+ y is the 
most information x and y can agree on-we call @ a consensus operator. Likewise 
x 63 y simply combines the knowledge represented by x with that represented by y, 
without checking for consistency-we call @ a &lability operator. The four 
operations A, V , 8, and @ are intimately connected: all 12 distributive laws hold. 
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There is a natural notion of negation: flip the diagram from left to right, 
switching false and true, leaving I and T alone. This is denoted 7. There is also 
a natural symmetry vertically, switching I and T , leaving false and true alone. 
This is denoted - and is called conflation. Conflation and negation commute: 
-1x= 7 --x. 
The role of conflation is less immediate than that of negation. Notice that the 
truth values left unchanged under conflation are false and true, the classical ones. 
These are marked with dark circles in Figure 1. The operations 7, A, and V, 
restricted to the values false and true, reduce to those of classical ogic. In addition, 
the values of P??VJLI! that contain no more information than their conflation 
(X sk --xl are false, true, and I , circled in Figure 1. It turns out that the 
operations A, V, and 7, restricted to false, true, and _L , are exactly those of 
Kleene’s strong three-valued logic. This way of distinguishing natural sublogics of 
5+ZPZ’~, using conflation, is something that carries over to bilattices generally. 
3. BILAITICE DEFINITIONS 
Now we turn to the general notion of bilattice-keep .5%VZ%’ in mind as a 
representative xample. A bilattice is a lattice-like structure with two inter-related 
orderings. Loosely, one of the orderings represents degree of truth, the other 
represents degree of knowledge, as with PZVYS’. We sketch ways bilattices arise in 
the next section, after the formal definitions have been presented. One can make 
assumptions of various strengths concerning relationships between the 
orderings-in this way one obtains different kinds of bilattices. We will need rather 
strong assumptions for this paper. 
Definition 3.1. A pre-biluttice is a structure (9, I, , I, >, where 2%’ is a nonempty 
set and I, and sk are each partial orderings giving ~8’ the structure of a 
lattice with a top and a bottom. 
REMARK. As originally defined, in 1193, both & and sk were required to yield 
complete lattices. In various subsequent papers completeness has sometimes been 
assumed, sometimes not. Generally it has been assumed if an application involved 
quantifiers, but it was not assumed if algebraic properties of bilattices were being 
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studied. We feel it is time to end this confusion. In this paper we do not assume 
completeness without saying so. Thus a pre-bilattice will specifically be called 
complete if its partial orderings give the structure of complete lattices. Similarly for 
interlaced and distributive bilattices below. 
Definition 3.2. In a pre-bilattice (58, & , I~), meet and join under <I are 
denoted A and V, and meet the join under sk are denoted Q and 6~. Top and 
bottom under I, are denoted true and false, and top and bottom under sk are 
denoted T and I . If the pre-bilattice is complete, infinitary meet and joint 
under I, are denoted A and V, and infinitary meet and join under sk are 
denoted lYl and X. 
The operations A and v should be thought of as generalizations of conjunction 
and disjunction in the classical space {false, true}. The operations @ (consensus) 
and CD (gullability) are not meaningful in the classical setting. One needs at least 
the structure of FEZ!~ for them to arise. Now we define the various basic notions 
we will be using here. 
Definition 3.3. A distributive bilattice is a pre-bilattice (~8, sr , sk ) in which all 12 
distributive laws connecting A, V, @I, and CD hold. An infinitely distributive 
biZattice is a complete pre-bilattice in which all infinitary, as well as all finitary, 
distributive laws hold. 
An example of a distributive law is x @ (y V z) = (x @ y) V (x @z). An example 
of an infinitary distributive law is x @ A { yi Ii E S} = A {x @ yi Ii E S}. There is a 
weaker notion than distributivity that also has played a role in the semantics of 
logic programming [ll, 121. 
Definition 3.4. The pre-bilattice (G’, I, , _+ < > satisfies the interlacing conditions if 
each of the lattice operations A, v , 8 , f~ is monotone with respect to both 
orderings. If the pre-bilattice is complete, it satisfies the infinitaly interlacing 
conditions if each of the infinitary meet and join operations is monotone with 
respect to both orderings. 
An example of an interlacing condition is: x1 sr y1 and x2 I, y2 implies x1 @x, 
I, y, @y,. An example of an infinitary interlacing condition is: xi I, yi for each 
i E S implies n{x,ii E S} st n{y$ E S}. A distributive bilattice meets the interlac- 
ing conditions as well. This is easily verified. However, an infinitely distributive 
bilattice need not meet the infinitary interlacing conditions. We will explicitly 
assume such conditions, when needed. 
As defined in [19], bilattices were required to have a negation operation, and the 
connection between the two orderings was a very simple one, expressed via 
negation. We find this too weak for our purposes, though negation still plays an 
important role here, along with the “dual” operation of conflation. In the follow- 
ing, bilattice refers to any of the above: distributive bilattice, complete distributive 
bilattice, interlaced bilattice, or complete interlaced bilattice. 
Definition 3.5. A bilattice has a negation if there is a mapping -J that reverses the 
I, ordering, leaves unchanged the sk ordering, and 7 7 x =x. Similarly a 
bilattice has a conflation if there is a mapping - that reverses the sk ordering, 
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leaves unchanged the 5, ordering, and - --x =x. If a bilattice has both, we say 
they commute if - 7x= 7 --x for all x. 
Bilattices can have negations without conflations, conflations without negations, 
neither, or both. Examples are not hard to come by. 
4. BILA’ITICE CONSTRUCTIONS 
Bilattices come up in natural ways-indeed the simplest nontrivial bilattice, 
5%%Y2P, was already introduced in [31. Two general, but different, constructions 
have appeared in the literature. We sketch them briefly here in order to give a 
feeling for bilattices and their possible applications. 
The first construction comes from [191 and is completely general for distributive 
bilattices-that is, a representation theorem can be proved. Here we follow the 
presentation of [ll]. 
Suppose we have two lattices, (L,, <i > and (L2, s2 >. Think of L, as the 
lattice of values we use when we measure the degree of belief, evidence, confi- 
dence, etc. that we have in a sentence. Likewise, think of L, as what we use when 
we measure the degree of doubt, counter-evidence, lack of confidence, etc. that we 
have against a sentence. For instance, L, and L, could both be just (false, true), 
with false 5 true, where we have all-or-nothing judgments. Or each could be the 
unit interval, with the standard ordering. Or L, could be the unit interval and L, 
could be {false, true}, a choice that is appropriate for a theoretical science, where 
one has a degree of confidence in a sentence, but a single counter-experiment is 
enough to falsify. Or again, L, and L, could be sets of experts, ordered by 
inclusion (the {false, true} example can be thought of as arising from a single 
expert). 
Now we define a structure L,OL, as follows. The structure is (L, x L,, I, , sk >, 
where: 
l (x1,x2) st (y1,y2) if x1 sl Y, and Y, s2 x2; 
l (x1,x2) Sk (yl,y,) if x1 q y, and x2 s2 y,. 
The idea is that knowledge goes up if evidence, both for and against, goes up; 
degree of truth goes up if evidence for goes up while evidence against goes down. 
It is straightforward to verify that L,OL, will always be a bilattice meeting the 
interlacing conditions, and if L, and L, are complete, L,OL, will be a complete 
bilattice meeting the infinitary interlacing conditions as well. Further, if both L, 
and L, are distributive lattices, L,OL, will be a distributive bilattice, and if L, 
and L, are complete and infinitely distributive, L,OL, will be an infinitely 
distributive bilattice. This can be carried yet further. If L, = L, = L, then we are 
measuring belief and doubt the same way, and so a negation can be introduced into 
the bilattice LOL in the obvious way: set 7 (x, y > = (y, x). This is easily seen to 
meet the appropriate conditions for a negation operation. The intuition is straight- 
forward: In passing from a member of LOL to its negation we simply switch the 
roles of belief and doubt. Finally, suppose L, = L, = L, and further suppose that L 
has an order reversing involution (we denote the involute of x by 2). Such an 
operation is called a de Morgan complement. Then a conflation operation can be 
introduced into LOL as well. Set - (x, y > = (J, X>. Once again it is easy to verify 
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that this meets the conditions for a conflation operation, and conflation and 
negation will commute. 
The idea behind this notion of conflation is a little more complicated than that 
behind negation. Think, for example, of L as being the unit interval, with members 
measuring degree of belief or doubt. Set X = 1 -x, which is a de Morgan comple- 
ment. Then - (x, y ) = (1 -y, 1 -x>, and so in passing from a member of LOL to 
its conflation, we replace the degree of belief by the degree to which we did not 
doubt, and we replace the degree of doubt by the degree to which we did not 
believe. Many other examples of this nature can be given. 
A de Morgan lattice is a distributive lattice with a de Morgan complement. Thus 
we have the following: If L is a de Morgan lattice, LOL is a distributive bilattice 
with a negation and a conflation that commute. 
The simplest nontrivial de Morgan lattice is L = {false, true}, of course, with 
false I true. The corresponding bilattice, LOL, is just ~W’ZLZ’ all over again, with 
I = (false, false), T = (true, true), false = (false, true), and true = (true, false). 
The bilattice F@“%LZ’ has a long history. It was introduced in 141, outfitted with two 
orderings in [3], and recognized as a bilattice in [19]. 
The method just sketched for constructing bilattices is general for the distribu- 
tive case. That is, one can show representation theorems along the following lines. 
If .G’ is a distributive bilattice, it is isomorphic to L,OL,, where L, and L, are 
distributive lattices. If ~8 has a negation, L, and L, can be taken to be the same 
lattice. If ~‘8 has a negation and a conflation that commute, L, is a de Morgan 
lattice. Proofs of this can be found in [19], [ll], and [16]. In fact, the result can be 
looked at as a variation on the polarities theorem of Dunn, which goes back to his 
dissertation of 1966 (see [5]). 
A bilattice with conflation and negation that commute with each other contains 
some natural sublogics within it. Suppose B’ is such a bilattice. Call a member 
x Es consistent if x Ik -x, and call x exuct if x = -x. Just as with .R%ZZ, the 
exact members of a bilattice always form a generalization of the classical truth 
values. In particular, they are closed under A, V, and 7. In the bilattice LOL, 
where L is the unit interval, for instance, the exact members are those of the form 
(x, y), where y = 1 -x; thus they are the ones for which doubt exactly comple- 
ments belief. The consistent members of a bilattice also are closed under A, V, 
and 7. In addition they are closed under @, and under f~ when applied to a set 
that is directed under sk . In 191 these facts were used to generalize Kripke’s 
theory of truth to bilattices, and in [12] they played a role in developing a semantics 
for logic programming. In the bilattice based on the unit interval, mentioned above, 
the consistent values are those (x, y) for which x + y I 1, and thus represent 
situations where belief and doubt are not contradictory. 
There is a second way in which bilattices arise naturally. It was sketched in [19] 
and developed in detail in [14]. The idea is to think of the consistent members as 
“approximations” to the exact values. This approach leads directly to Kleene’s 
three-valued logic and indirectly to 5WZ.%, rather than the other way around, as 
above. 
Suppose we have a lattice of truth values L. Think of these as the “real” values 
we are interested in. In classical ogic the intended lattice is (false, true}. If we have 
two independent experts, say A and B, we have a more complicated lattice to work 
with, because the experts might disagree. In this case the natural lattice of truth 
values to work with is {0, {A}, {B}, {A, B)}, ordered by inclusion, where we think of 
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a set of experts as a representation that those experts said “yes” to a query. Other 
lattices of truth values arise if we allow probabilities as truth values, and so on. 
In general we may be uncertain about the status of a sentence: what truth value 
in L to assign to it. Our ignorance may not be total, however; we may have some 
information to work with. In [14] approximations to a “real” truth value were 
represented by intervals containing that truth value. 
Definition 4.1. Let a, b EL, where L is a lattice, and assume a I, 6. The interval 
[a, 61 is {x E Lla sL x sL 6). AL) is the set of all intervals in L. 
Now we take the space of intervals and give it a bilattice-like structure. 
Definition 4.2. Let L be a lattice. _%$L) is the structure (AL), I, , sk >, where 
the following hold for [a, 61, [c, d] l 3 L): 
(1) [a, 61 I, [c, dl if a sL c and b q d; 
(2) [a, 61 Sk [c, dl if [c, dl c [a, 61. 
The idea is, knowledge increases if the approximation interval narrows, and 
degree of truth increases if the interval shifts upward in the ordering of L. 
This can be carried a little further. Suppose L also has an order-reversing 
involution, a de Morgan complement (again we denote the de Morgan complement 
of x by Z). Then. a negation can be introduced in &L) by 
l[a,b] = [~,a]. 
As an example, suppose we start with the lattice of classical truth values, 
L = {false, true}. Then A?(L) has three members, two one-point intervals, [false, 
false] and [true, true], and the entire lattice, [false, true]. The entire lattice 
represents a state of no information-denote it by I . Likewise [false, false] can 
be identified with fake, and [true, true] with true. Then the ordering sr of Z(L) 
yields operations A and v that are those of Kleene’s strong three-valued logic, 
and the negation operation on A?(L) is likewise that of Kleene’s logic. The sk 
ordering puts _L below both false and true, which are incomparable. It is the 
natural notion of approximation in this context, 
Kleene’s three-valued logic, it was noted above, is a sublogic of F&?Y2?--the 
sublogic of consistent members. In fact this relationship is quite general, and thus 
the notion of interval approximation yields another approach to bilattices. Proofs 
of the following can be found in [14]. 
Theorem 4.3. Suppose L is a lattice with a de Morgan complement. Then A?(L) is 
isomorphic to the set of consistent members of an interlaced bilattice A? having a 
negation and a conf?ation that commute. If, further, L is distributive (that is, L is a 
de Morgan lattice), 9 will be a distributive bilattice. 
Theorem 4.4. Suppose 9 is a distributive bilattice with a negation and a conflation 
that commute. Then the set of consistent members of 9 is isomorphic to A?(L), 
where L is a de Morgan lattice. 
REMARK. As proved in 1141, the isomorphisms of the theorems above did not take 
negations into account. However, it is simple to check that the isomorphisms do 
respect the negation operations as well. 
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Thus we have two rather different approaches that both lead to bilattices. In one 
version we can think of assigning evidence for a sentence as being independent of 
assigning evidence against it. In the other we work with approximations to the 
“real” truth values. As the theorems above indicate, these give rise to essentially 
the same structures. Among these structures are Belnap’s four-valued logic, with 
Kleene’s three-valued logic as a sublogic. These can be thought of as the setting for 
much of the semantical work on logic programming that has appeared in the 
literature, and thus our discussion below, which concerns bilattices in general, 
applies directly to the usual notions of stable, stationary, and well-founded models. 
5. LOGIC PROGRAMS 
We want to define logic programs in as general a way as possible, so that the 
results proved later on will be widely applicable. Conventional ogic programming 
is thought of as having {false, true} as its intended space of truth values, but since 
not every query may produce an answer, partial models are often allowed. That is, 
I is added. Likewise, if a mechanism that can produce inconsistent programs is 
introduced, T must also be considered. Thus 9ZP’Z9 can be thought of as the 
“home” of ordinary logic programming. In this section we want to extend the 
notion of logic program, so that a bilattice 9’ other than 97@‘2Yz2? canbe thought of 
as the space of truth values. The more general the setting allowed, the more 
general the results. 
Assume 9 is a complete (so that quantifiers can be interpreted) bilattice with 
negation. For starters, we might take a logic program to be a finite set of clauses. 
As usual in semantic discussions, we will think of a clause as standing for the 
possibly infinite set of its instances, over a Herbrand base GE Further, we will take a 
clause to be something of the form A +-B, where A is the head and B is the body 
of the clause. The question is, what should be allowed as head and body. 
As a first approximation, we might take a head to be an atomic formula A, and 
abodytobeafinitelist Li,..., L, of atomic formulas and their negations. We can 
assume equality is available, since we can always add the clause eq(x, x) + to a 
program. Then, in the usual way, clauses having the same predicate letter in their 
heads can be combined, provided we have conjunction, disjunction, and existential 
quantification explicitly available. For instance, the two clauses 
40x1) +C(x),D(x) 
combine into the single clause 
4~) + P4[(4y7x) ABG)) ” (eq(yJ(4) AC(x) AD(X))]. 
Notice also that the explicit quantification makes it possible for all free variables of 
the clause body to appear in the head and for the head to contain no function 
symbols. Since this transformation can always be done, it will simplify things if we 
generally assume that program bodies can be arbitrary formulas built up using 
A,“,-, 3, that all free variables in clause bodies also occur in clause heads, that 
clause heads contain no function symbols, and that programs are restricted so that 
a given predicate letter can occur in the head of only a single clause. 
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Further it will do no harm, at least semantically, if we also allow V, and by doing 
so we gain a useful advantage. The usual de Morgan laws hold in any bilattice with 
negation. That is, as might be expected, A and v are duals, as are 3 and V, so in a 
clause body we can always push negations all the way inside. Since we also have 
7 -J x =x, we can assume the only occurrences of the negation symbol are at the 
literal level. This will simplify things considerably. There is a significant problem 
with this, however. Allen Van Gelder has pointed out (private communication) that 
the definition of well-founded semantics from [30] and [31], based on the use of 
unfounded sets, apparently does not extend to include V. The alternating fixpoint 
approach from [29] does extend to allow it, and it is this approach that we 
generalize here. It is not the case that all program transformations that preserve 
meaning when using the original definition of well-founded semantics continue to 
do so when applied to programs containing V, using the alternating fixpoint 
approach. This cuueat must be kept in mind in what follows. 
Gelfond and Lifschitz [18] have introduced a kind of classical negation into logic 
programming. In addition to -J P(x) they also allow N P(x), where - is intended 
to behave classically. In particular, it is allowed in clause heads. In fact, for most 
purposes N P(x) can be treated semantically as if it were a new atom, P’(x). The 
exception is if a logic program involving this new notion of negation turns out to be 
inconsistent, in which case they argue that every query should have a yes answer. 
We feel this may sometimes be undesirable; that contradictions hould be localiz- 
able. If we have inconsistent information about ducks, it is possible that our 
information about decimals can still be trusted. To this end we do, in fact, treat 
N P(x) as a new atom, P’(x), but if we want to say that from a contradiction 
everything follows, we do so by explicitly adding clauses of the form A + B A B’ to 
a program, for every atom A and every literal B. However, this is not the only 
solution to the problem of what to do if we get yes answers to both the queries B 
and B’. We could, for instance, take B as overdefined, and act as if its truth value 
was T in the bilattice 9. In other circumstances we might want to take B as 
underdefined, I , and act accordingly. To allow for the utmost generality, we admit 
a mechanism for this into logic programs directly. We allow 8 and @ to appear in 
clause bodies. Then, if desired, we can include a clause real-B + B CD B’, for 
instance, to specify explicitly that a yes answer to both B and B’ should be thought 
of as overdefining B. Briefly, rather than determine once and for all how contradic- 
tions should be treated, we have added machinery to allow a program writer to 
specify this. Incidentally, Q and $ are their own duals under -I, so we still can 
assume negations only occur in literals. 
In conventional ogic programming the truth values true and false are available. 
The value true is generally implicit; A t is treated as if it were A + true. 
Likewise, having no clause for A is treated as if A + false were present. Since we 
have a more general truth value space in mind, we need a more general mecha- 
nism. We want to be able to write something like A + b, where b is some arbitrary 
member of the bilattice .zZ? (or maybe a member of a restricted sublogic of 9, such 
as its exact part). To this end, we simply treat members of Z% as atoms and allow 
them to appear in clause bodies. Semantically we will, of course, interpret them as 
designating themselves. 
l We call a formula that does not contain a member of 9 a pure formula. 
We now have arrived at a very general notion of logic program, relative to the 
bilattice 9. It is broad enough to encompass a variety of generalizations of 
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conventional logic programming. Note, however, that we have not included a 
mechanism for disjunctive logic programming. This must wait on further research. 
Now, to summarize precisely. 
Definition 5.1. 
(1) A formula is an expression built up from literals and members of 9 using 
A, V, @, @I, 3, and V. 
(2) A clause is P(x,,. . ., x,) + &xl,. . ., x,), where the pure atomic formula 
P(x 1 ,..., x,J is the head, and the formula cp(x, ..., x,) is the body. It is 
assumed that the free variables of the body are among xi,. . .,x,. 
(3) A logic program is a finite set of clauses with no predicate letter appearing in 
the head of more than one clause. 
If 9 is a program, by .9* we mean the set of all ground instances of members of 
9, over the Herbrand base. 
We will often want to use conventional logic programs as examples. To make 
this easier, we introduce the following. 
Convention. A conventional ogic program is one whose underlying truth value 
space is the bilattice .Y&VY.% and which does not involve @, 63, V, T , or _L . 
Such programs can be written in the customary way, using commas to denote 
conjunction. 
6. THE GELFOND-LIFSCHITZ TRANSFORMATION 
In [6] and [17] the stable model semantics for logic programs was introduced and a 
number of basic results reported. Since this definition and the results will be 
generalized here, we include the original characterization for reference. For this 
section only, program will mean a conventional ogic program. Also the semantics 
is based on classical ogic, REP’9 restricted to its exact values. In this case, then, 
we can follow the usual convention of identifying a classical Herbrand model with 
the set of ground atoms that are true in it. 
The semantics of positive programs (those containing no negations in clause 
bodies) is well understood. In the classic papers [281 and [l] it was shown that a 
positive program has a unique smallest model, and that smallest model is well- 
behaved and relates nicely to other semantical approaches. The notion of smallest 
used here is with respect to the subset relation, identifying a model with a set of 
ground atoms as mentioned above. In order to extend this to programs with 
negations, Gelfond and Lifschitz proposed the following approach. Start with a set 
S that is a candidate for a model of program 9; use S to give meaning to the 
negative literals of 9, thus converting it into a positive program 9’; then compute 
the smallest model of 9’. If this turns out to be S again, S is a good candidate for 
a model of 9. The conversion of 9 into 9’ is straightforward. If B is in S, we can 
assume B is true, so any clause in 9 containing 7 B in its body is unusable. If B 
is not in S, we can assume T B is true, so any occurrence of T B in a clause body 
of 9 can be replaced by true, or, equivalently, dropped. The following more formal 
treatment is still a sketch, and we adopt the convenience that the program is 
ground. 
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Definition 6.1. Let 9 be a conventional ground program and let S be a set of 
ground atoms. The Gelfond-Lifschitz transfomation of 9 relative to S is the 
positive program 9’ arising from 9 by the following: 
(1) deleting each clause in 9 that has a negative literal 7 B in its body, where 
B E S; 
(2) from the remaining set of clauses, deleting all negative literals. 
Let S’ be the least model of 9’. If S’ = S, then S is called a stable set. 
Gelfond and Lifschitz show that a stable set, if it exists, must be a model for the 
program, and so stable sets are often called stable models. In [30] and [31], another 
semantics-called the well-founded semantics-is introduced, and it is shown that if 
a program has a well-founded (two-valued) model, that will be its unique stable 
model as well. Connections with other semantical approaches were also estab- 
lished, but these will not concern us here. The results just mentioned are general- 
ized later on in this paper. 
The semantics ketched above is classical, two-valued. Rather early on, however, 
the approach was extended to allow partial, or three-valued, models. Once this was 
done, it was possible to show a stable model always exists, though it may be partial. 
We will consider this point more thoroughly below. For now, we merely remark on 
an issue of terminology. Stable models were originally intended to be two-valued 
models. When generalized, three-valued stable models were talked about. 
Przymusinski ntroduced the terminology stationary for three-valued stable, reserv- 
ing the term stable for the two-valued case. We will not follow this terminology 
here (preferring to believe the term stable has some stability to it). Since we will be 
extending notions beyond the classical setting, to fairly arbitrary bilattices, we 
prefer to minimize terminology as far as possible to keep the comprehensible 
complexity of the paper down. 
7. IMMEDIATE CONSEQUENCE OPERATORS 
In [28] and [ll an “immediate consequence” operator T9 is associated with each 
positive, conventional program 9, mapping sets of formulas to sets of formulas. 
Loosely the idea is that one application of T9 represents carrying out a single step 
of deduction, based on the program 9. It is shown that T9 is monotonic (in the 
subset relation) and has a smallest fixed point. That tixed point is taken to be the 
semantic meaning of the program 9. It is this that was used in the previous section 
to associate a model with the positive program 9’ resulting from the 
Gelfond-Lifschitz transformation. The operator T9 makes sense for programs 9 
allowing negation in clause bodies, but then it loses its monotonicity feature, so a 
fixed point can no longer be guaranteed. 
In [7] and [8] this approach was extended to a three-valued setting, in which case 
the operator is generally denoted a9. This operator turns out to be well-behaved, 
even for programs having negations in clause bodies, but the intended ordering 
must be changed. When T9 is used, one thinks of the natural ordering as one in 
which an increase means more ground atoms are true. When using a9 an increase 
loosely means more literals acquire classical truth values. Thus the two orderings 
of a bilattice begin to be visible: T9 uses the truth ordering, Q9 uses the 
knowledge ordering. This will be made more precise below. At any rate, it can be 
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shown that aP always has a smallest fixed point under the appropriate ordering, 
whether negations are present or not, and this can be taken as a meaning for the 
program 9’. It is not always a satisfactory meaning, and has led to modifications 
120, 211 and to the alternative approaches ketched earlier. 
In [ll] and [12] the three-valued approach was generalized to the family of 
bilattices meeting the interlacing conditions. The first thing is to extend the 
representation of a valuation. In the classical approach, a model is often identified 
with a set of ground atoms, those that are true in the model. Then the subset 
relation corresponds to the I, ordering of bilattices. In the three-valued ap- 
proach, a model is sometimes identified with a (consistent) set of ground literals, 
where if a ground atom A is in the set, it means A has the value true in the model; 
if 7 A is in the set, it means A has the value false in the model; if neither A nor 
7 A is in the set, it means A has the value undefined, or -L , in the model. Under 
this representation, the subset relation corresponds to the sk ordering of bilat- 
tices. However, when moving to more general settings, representation by sets of 
formulas is no longer adequate. 
Definition 7.1. Let 39 be a bilattice. By a valuation in 55’ we mean a mapping v 
from pure ground atoms to members of 9. The family of all valuations is 
denoted V(&P). It is given two pointwise orderings: 
(1) u1 <I u2 if and only if u,(A) I, u,(A) for every pure ground atom A; 
(2) u1 sk u2 if and only if u,(A) S, u,(A) for every pure ground atom A. 
The space of valuations itself is a bilattice and inherits much of the structure of 
the underlying bilattice. Let us be more precise. First, 57’(g) = (y(g), I, , I,) 
is a pre-bilattice. (u A w)(A) = UC A) A WC A), and similarly for the other operations. 
V(B) is complete if z&’ is complete. ?V;-(s) is distributive if &7 is distributive. 
V(g) is infinitely distributive if .%’ is infinitely distributive. V(g) satisfies the 
interlacing conditions if 9 satisfies them, and V(G’l satisfies the infinitary 
interlacing conditions if ~6’ does. Finally, ctr(.%‘) will have a negation or a 
conflation if G’ does. All this is straightforward, and verification is omitted. 
The action of a valuation is easily extended from pure ground atoms to all 
formulas. If b ~58, set u(b) = b. Further, set u(X A Y > = u(X) A u(Y 1, where the 
A on the right is the meet of 9 in the I, ordering; similarly for v , 8, CB, and 7 
(assuming 2 has a negation operation). Assuming completeness too, we can also 
set u(Elxlcp(x)) = C(u(qo(t))l all closed terms t} (the operation is the infinitary join 
under I, >; similarly for the universal quantifier. 
Connections with earlier work are easy to make. Suppose we use the bilattice 
.5W”Z%, shown in Figure 1. This is infinitely distributive and has negation and 
conflation. Hence, so does its space of valuations. A valuation in ~v’z?/~ corre- 
sponds to a set of pure ground literals in a direct way. Say the valuation u and the 
set S correspond provided the following hold: 
1. u(A) = I if and only if A E S and 7 A g S; 
2. u(A) = false if and only if A E S and 7 A E S; 
3. u(A) = true if and only if A E S and 7 A E S; 
4. u(A)=T ifandonlyif AESand --,AES. 
Then, if the valuation u and the set S correspond, u is exact just in the case S 
contains exactly one of each pure ground atom and its negation; u is consistent just 
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in the case S is consistent as a set. This correspondence should be kept in mind in 
what follows. 
Suppose now that B’ is a complete bilattice with negation, and 9 is a program 
as in Definition 5.1. We associate with it an operator QP on the space of 
valuations. The idea directly extends the three-valued Qg operator mentioned 
above. Recall that programs are assumed to have at most one defining clause for 
each predicate letter, and all free variables of a clause body also appear in the 
clause head. It follows that, for a ground atom A, at most one member of 9* can 
have A as head (recall that g* is the set of ground instances of members of 9). 
Definition Z2. Qg: Y’Y.55’) -+ Y”(g) is defined as follows. Let UE z”(a); cP,(u> is 
the valuation such that the following hold: 
(1) if the pure ground atom A is not the head of any member of P*, 
QP(nXA) = false; 
(2) if A + B occurs in 9*, (P,(uXA) = v(B). 
This operator naturally generalizes those mentioned above. Suppose A? is the 
bilattice PBVY.58’ of Figure 1. Then, if 9 is a conventional program without 
negations, on exact valuations aP behaves like the operator T9. Further, if 9 is a 
conventional program allowing negations, on consistent valuations (PP behaves like 
the Kripke-Kleene partial operator of [7]. 
It can be shown that if 9 meets the finitary and infinitary interlacing conditions, 
QP is always monotone in the sk ordering of U(B) and thus must have tixed 
points. These fixed points are natural generalizations to the bilattice setting of 
models. Further, @T will be monotone in the I, ordering if 9 has no negations. 
Relationships between extremal fixed points of Qg are established in 1121. 
8. THE GELFOND-LIFSCHITZ TRANSFORMATION GENERALIZED 
In Section 7 we saw how the immediate consequence operator T, generalizes to 
the bilattice setting. What we want is to produce a similar generalization of the 
Gelfond-Lifshitz transformation of Section 6. In order to do this it is necessary to 
shift the point of view from that of program transformations to that of operators on 
valuations. Suppose we have a conventional ogic program ?P and we have a set S 
of pure ground atoms. Carry out the Gelfond-Lifschitz transformation on 9, 
relative to S, getting the positive program 9’. This program has a smallest fixed 
point S’, which is another set of pure ground atoms. Thus an operator has been 
associated with the program 9’: the operator that turns S into S’. In [29] this was 
called the stability operator. It is the stability operator that we generalize in this 
section, following 1131. 
One of the ideas behind the stable model approach-and the well-founded 
approach, too-is to separate the roles of positive and negative information. Thus 
we extend the immediate consequence operator of Section 7 to reflect this 
separation. The extended immediate consequence operator will accept two input 
valuations: one assigning meanings to positive literals, the other to negative literals. 
This means we will sometimes want to think of a negative literal 7 A as a strangely 
written atom, with no connections to A. We use the term 9-pseudovaluation for a 
mapping from pure ground literals to B’. When using a pseudovaluation the value 
assigned to T A can be quite independent of the value assigned to A. 
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Now we introduce a convenient notation for representing a pseudovaluation in 
terms of real valuations. 
Definition 8.1. Let vi and v2 be valuations in the bilattice 9 with negation. We 
define a pseudovaluation in 9, vi A v2, as follows: For a pure ground atom A, 
(?A?)(A) =r+(A), 
(vlAvZ)(~A)= TV*(A). 
Pseudovaluations are extended to nonliterals by induction, in the obvious way. 
The idea is that, in v1 A v2, v1 supplies the positive information and v2 supplies 
the negative information. Now Definition 7.2 can be suitably generalized. We use 
q for the new operator and keep Q, as it was defined earlier, since we will need it 
as well. 
Definition 8.2. The extended immediate consequence operator, ‘P9: F’XS’) X ?7/(9> 
+ V(9), is defined as follows. Let v1,v2 E Y(9); Yr,(v,,v,) is the valuation 
such that the following hold: 
(1) if the pure ground atom A is not the head of any member of 9*, 
q9(v,, v,)(A) = false; 
(2) if A + B occurs in 9*, q9(v,, v,)(A) = (vi A v,XB). 
In q9 positive and negative input has been separated. It is easy to see that 
Q‘Jv> = 9,(v, v). 
Definition 8.3. A mapping f on a partially ordered space is monotonic if x ly 
implies f(x) I f(y); it is antimonotonic if x ly implies f(x) 2 f(y). 
If we assume the interlacing conditions hold for 9, under the ordering sk , q9 
is monotonic in both arguments, but under the ordering sr , q9 is monotonic in 
its first argument and antimonotonic in its second. (Proofs of these and other 
results are given in the Appendix.) Then under the sr ordering, if we hold the 
second argument of q9 fixed, we have a monotone operator of its first argument 
and this will have a least fixed point. Thus we can make the following definition. 
Definition 8.4. The derived (or stability) operator of q9 is the single input mapping 
W$ given by the following: 9&(v) is the smallest fixed point, in the <I ordering, 
of the mapping ( hx)V9(x, v). 
It is the derived operator, q&, that generalizes the Gelfond-Lifschitz transfor- 
mation. Suppose 9 is a conventional ogic program and 9 is the bilattice RRY9’ 
of Figure 1. Let S be a consistent set of ground literals, and let v be the valuation 
in 9 that corresponds to S. Suppose S’ is the least fixed point of the program 9’, 
which is the result of applying the Gelfond-Lifschitz transformation to 9 with 
respect to S. Then the set S’ and the valuation *A(v) will also correspond. We 
leave it to you to check this. 
Definition 8.5. A stable valuation for program 9 is a fixed point of W$. 
Note, then, that for the bilattice 9EV9, a stable valuation that is exact 
corresponds to a two-valued stable set in the sense of [171, and a stable valuation 
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that is consistent but not necessarily exact corresponds to a stationary set in the 
sense of Przymusinski. 
9. RESULTS 
In this section results are presented. Proofs are omitted here, but can be found in 
the Appendix. An examination of the proofs will show that almost without 
exception they are simple algebraic consequences of the elementary properties of 
bilattices and of the monotonicity or antimonotonicity of operators. For the rest of 
this section, &Y is a fixed bilattice of truth values, which we assume is infinitely 
distributive, satisfying the interlacing laws, finitary and infinitary, and with a 
negation and a conflation that commute. Also, 9 is a program, meeting the 
conditions of Definition 5.1. As in the previous section, qp is the extended 
immediate consequence operator for program 9, and *& is its derived operator. 
Theorem 9.1. The operator q&, is monotonic in the sk ordering and antimonotonic 
in the I, ordering. 
Since the derived operator is monotonic in the I, direction and 9 is a 
complete lattice under this ordering, the Knaster-Tarski theorem [26] applies. 
Theorem 9.2. The operator 9; has a smallest fixed point, denoted by s$, and a 
greatest Jixed point, denoted S$,, by under the sk ordering. 
This means every program has at least one stable valuation, a fundamental 
result of [24]. In fact, the least stable valuation So ’ has been singled out before as 
playing a special role. We will say more about it below. The greatest stable 
valuation S$ has been ignored, essentially because consistency was required of 
logic programs. Once various degrees of inconsistency are allowed, the essential 
symmetry of the situation becomes apparent. There is both a least and a greatest 
stable valuation, in the sk sense. 
Although stable valuations exist, we have not yet established in what sense they 
are models for the program. We give a definition of model that is, in fact, rather 
strong. 
Definition 9.3. A valuation v is a model for the program Z? provided, for each pure 
ground atom A, if A +-B in p*, v(A) = u(B), and otherwise u(A) =false. 
Now the role of the immediate consequence operator Qp is clear. Obviously u is 
a model of 9 if and only if u is a fixed point of ap. Then the result of 1171, that 
stable sets are models, has a full generalization. 
Theorem 9.4. Every stable valuation is a model. That is, every jixed point of ‘P& is also 
a jixed point of QP. 
The behavior of q& with respect to the sk ordering is thus rather straightfor- 
ward. With respect to the I, ordering, however, things are more complicated, 
since the operator is antimonotonic in this direction. As it happens, there is a 
straightforward modification of the Knaster-Tarski theorem that deals with this. It 
seems to have first appeared in [32], where it was used as the basis of an interesting 
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Theory of Truth. It lies behind the alternating fixpoint approach to the well-founded 
model, as presented in [29]. It was also used in [2] to show the existence of stable 
classes. 
Theorem 9.5. Suppose f is antimonotonic on the complete lattice L. Then there are two 
members of L-p and v-such that the following hold: 
(1) t.~ and v are the least and the greatest jked points off ‘; 
(2) f oscillates between p and v in the sense that f< PI= v and fC v) = p; 
(3) if x and y are also points of L between which f oscillates, x and y lie between p 
and v. 
Now, q&, is antimonotonic under sr , so by the theorem above, it has two 
extreme oscillation points in this ordering. 
Definition 9.6. The extreme oscillation points of 9’ are denoted by s$, and S$, 
with s$ q S$,. 
The valuations s$ and S$ need not themselves be stable, but two stable 
valuations are easily derivable from them. 
Theorem 9.7. The valuations ~$8 S$ and s$ CB S$ are both jixed points of ?A and 
hence are stable models. 
The model ~$8 S$ plays a special role in several ways. For conventional 
programs, using the bilattice STB’Z~, it is the well-founded model [30,311, following 
the construction of [29]. If we think of s$ and SG as under estimates and 
overestimates for a model, the well-founded model s& @ S$, is the most the 
estimates agree on-their consensus. The model s$, $ S$ has not been considered 
before in the literature, primarily because inconsistent truth values have been 
ruled out. It is, however, a natural dual to the well-founded model, accepting 
everything either of the extreme oscillation points of T& have to contribute. 
An important connection was established between well-founded semantics and 
stable semantics in [24] and 1221 for conventional programs. Essentially it says that 
the well-founded model is the “simplest” stable model, where the ordering used is 
essentially Sk of ~W%LZ. That result not only generalizes to bilattices, but 
dualizes as well. 
Theorem 9.8. The extremal fixed points of q’ under sk are related to the extremal 
oscillation points under I, as follows: 
(1) s~=s&As&; 
(2) s; = s; @ s$?. 
Thus the distribution of the family of stable models is neatly bounded. All stable 
models are between s$ and S$ in the sk ordering, with these as least and 
greatest stable models in this ordering. All stable models are between s$ and S&, 
in the I, ordering, with these points themselves not necessarily included. This is 
summarized in Figure 2. 
Rather remarkably, the result presented in Theorem 9.8 has a counterpart, 
relating the extremal points of the stability operator the other way around. 
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FIGURE 2. Stable models 
in the space of valuations. 
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Theorem 9.9. 
(1) s; = s; A s;; 
(2) s; = s: v s$. 
Theorems 9.8 and 9.9 should be compared with Theorem 7.7 of [12]. Finally, it 
was shown in [30] and [31] that if a conventional program has a two-valued 
(classical) well-founded model, it is also the unique stable model. The analog for 
bilattices of a classical model is a model that is exact in the space of valuations. 
Then, with a restriction on programs added, the result extends directly. 
Dejinition 9.10. We call a program 9 consistent if no program body contains the 
operator @ and the only members of 9’ that occur in program bodies are 
consistent ones. 
Conventional ogic programs are obviously consistent ones. Part of the justifica- 
tion for the terminology is contained in the following. 
Theorem 9.11. If 9 is a consistent program, s& and S$, are consistent in the space of 
valuations. 
Now the Gelfond-Lifschitz result extends to the following. 
Corollary 9.12. Suppose L? is a consistent program and the (well-founded) model 
& = ~$8 S$ is exact. Then it is the unique stable model. 
10. EXAMPLES 
We give a few small examples to illustrate the results of the previous section. The 
first two concern the bilattice 9EVB and conventional ogic programs. 
Example 10.1. Using the bilattice 9?%Y9, consider the following logic program: 
A+-,B 
B+ 7A 
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This has four stable models. Two of them are S& and S$, the least and greatest in 
the sk ordering. The model S: is the well-founded model. Neither of these is 
exact. In addition, there are two more stable models, both exact (we denote them u 
and w>. Finally, s&, and S& exist as valuations, though neither is a model. These 
are given in the following table: 
4 Sk 
k 
s.9 G v W 
A false true I T true false 
B false true I T false true 
The relative positions of these valuations in the space of all valuations is shown in 
Figure 3. Note that v and w are incomparable in both orderings. 
Example 10.2. Again we use the bilattice 5W’%‘9. The program is 
B+- TA 
C+TBVD 
D--ID 
For this program, the extremal valuations are shown in the following table: 
a 
The stable model ,S$ is not consistent in the space of valuations. Even so, it does 
not degenerate to triviality. Under it, C and D are overdefined, but A and B still 
have useful values. Allowing inconsistencies does not have to mean surrendering to 
chaos. 
Example 10.3. For this rather different example we use a bilattice based on the 
unit interval: take 9’ = LOL, where L is [O,l] with the usual ordering. For this 
FIGURE 3. Distribution of valuations. 
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bilattice additional operations besides the usual ones can be introduced, to some 
profit. We are interested in what we will call attenuation operators. Specifically, for 
each r E [O, l] we introduce a mapping &,: ~8’ XL%’ +B, where _$:((x, y >) = (m, 1 
- r(l -y)>. It is simple to check that each attenuation operator maps exact maps 
to exact values, consistent values to consistent values, and is monotonic under both 
I, and sk . 
When writing programs we can allow the syntactic use of L& treating it the same 
way we do negation. We extend valuations to attenuation operators in the obvious 
way: v(_c9 cp) = L$(v( cp)>. NOW, assume the Herbrand base consists of 
{a, f(a), f(G)), . . .I an consider the following program 9: d 
In [27] van Emden introduced a logic programming language with the unit 
interval as its set of truth values. What we are considering now is a generalization 
of that. Numerical factors were associated with each clause, in the van Emden 
paper. These correspond to the attenuation operators introduced above. More 
precisely, if we only apply attenuation operators to entire clause bodies, only allow 
exact members of ~8 in clause bodies, and restrict logical operators to A, V, and 
3, the system is essentially that of van Emden. 
The program 9 has an attenuation operator in a clause body, something that 
was not mentioned in Section 9. However, we observed above that attenuation 
operators are monotone in both bilattice orderings. It is a simple task to check 
that, as a consequence, almost every proof in the Appendix continues to be valid 
even if attenuation operators are present. The exceptions are Theorem 9.11 and 
Corollary 9.12, which use the notion of a consistent program, a notion that needs 
redefining when attenuation operators are present. Thus the entire machinery of 
stable and well-founded models applies. In fact, the program 9 is rather well- 
behaved. A direct calculation shows that the smallest and greatest stable models in 
the sk ordering coincide and are exact. Hence the well-founded model is the 
unique stable model. It is not, however, the only model. The least and greatest 
fixed points of cDg are different. Along with the well-founded model, they are 
partly given in the following table, under the names pP and v~: 
P(a) 
P(f(d) 
P(f2W) 
P(f 3(aN 
P(f‘va)) 
s9 9 k =Sk P9 VP 
(O,l> 640) (41) 
(0.9,O.l) (0,O.l) a9,1> 
(0.09,0.91) (0.09,O.l) (0.9,0.91) 
(0.819.0.181) (0.09,0.181) (0.819,0.91) 
(0.1629,0.8371) (0.1629,0.181) (0.819,0.8371) 
Notice that the largest (nonstable) model, v,, is not consistent in the space of 
valuations. Still, it displays considerable structure. The values it assigns to ground 
atoms are uniformly not consistent in LB, but as n increases the value assigned to 
P(f”(a)) grows “less inconsistent.” Incidentally, in all cases, as n increases, the 
value assigned to P(f”(a)> approaches (0.4736.. . ,0.5263.. . > as a limit. This value 
is exact. 
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11. CONCLUSION 
Stable models-and in particular the well-founded model-have received much 
attention in the literature recently. There is a general feeling that this approach 
comes closer to capturing the meaning of logic programs that other attempts. We 
have seen that the family of stable models has some remarkably simple bounds, 
bounds that are closely inter-related. This adds to their interest, but there is still 
much to be done. For instance, how does this work extend to disjunctive logic 
programs? In addition there are general structural questions: We have established 
bounds on the family of stable models; is there more structure to be discovered? 
The fixed points of a monotone operator in a complete lattice form another 
complete lattice. The derived operator W& is monotonic under sk and its fixed 
points are the stable models. What additional information is given by knowing the 
stable models constitute a complete lattice themselves? 
We have broadened the usual context of logic programming semantics by 
insisting that inconsistent ruth values be allowed and be taken seriously. We feel 
this is fundamental. Inconsistencies in information are facts of life; we often 
believe that different inconsistencies really are different. It should be possible to 
model this feeling in the semantics. We hope others will follow up on this point. 
Finally, we have worked with the general family of bilattices, rather than 
confining things to the setting of conventional logic programming. This adds no 
complexity to the proofs in the Appendix. Instead it helps makes clear the rather 
simple assumptions on which the stable model semantics rests. Among the variety 
of bilattices, there are many of intrinsic interest. We would like to see program 
languages developed and experimented with that use other bilattices, in the sense 
that conventional logic programming uses .R@%%?. There may be useful things 
here. 
APPENDIX-PROOFS 
Proofs of the results presented in Section 9 are collected together here. It should 
quickly become apparent that these are all algebraic consequences of elementary 
properties of bilattices and the stability operator. We begin by assuming enough 
properties of the underlying bilattice so that things are well-behaved. 
Assumption. For this section, B’ is an infinitely distributive bilattice, satisfying the 
interlacing laws, finitary and infinitary, and with a negation and a conflation that 
commute. 
Lemma. Let u,, v2, wl, w2 E Y(B) and let A be a ground formula with all negations 
at the literal level. Then the following hold: 
(1) if v, &. v2, then vl( A) sk v,(A); 
(2) if A does not contain 7 and if v1 <I v2, then vl( A) st I+,( A); 
(3) if v, sk v2 and w, sk w2, then v, Aw, sk v2 Aw,; 
(4) if v, I, v2 and w2 I, w,, then v1 Aw, 5, v2 Aw,. 
PROOF. The lemma holds if A is atomic by definition of the orderings in y(B), 
Definition 7.1. It extends to literals using the definition of negation, Definition 3.5, 
and Definition 8.1. Then the extension to more complex formulas is by a straight- 
forward induction on the degree of A, using the interlacing conditions, Definition 
3.4. q 
Proposition. In the space of valuations the following hold: 
(1) the operator Gp (Definition 7.2) is monotonic under sk ; 
(2) the operator qp (De$nition 8.2) is monotonic in both arguments under sk , 
and under the ordering I, it is monotonic in its first argument and antimono- 
tonic in its second. 
PROOF. Suppose u1 --<k v2 and let A be a pure ground atom; we want to show 
Q9(u,)(A) & @,Ju,)(A). If A does not occur as the head of any member of 9*, 
trivially @.&V,)(A) = (P,(u,XA), since both are false, so the result is immediate. 
Otherwise, if A + B ~9*, @p(u,)(A) = v,(B), and similarly for v2, so we need 
that u,(B) sk u,(B); this is the case by part 1 of the previous lemma. This 
establishes item 1. Item 2 is established by a similar argument, using parts 3 and 4 
of the lemma. c] 
This proposition is central for virtually all of what follows. Now, before we 
continue we take a moment to recall the two usual proofs of the Knaster-Tarski 
theorem. 
Suppose L is a complete lattice and f is monotone on L. The Knaster-Tarski 
theorem says, among other things, that f has a smallest fixed point s. There are 
two ways of “constructing” this fixed point, and each leads to a technique for 
proving things about it. 
In one approach, the least fixed point of f is shown to be A{x E Llf(x) sx}. It 
follows that if f(x) IX, then s 5 x. This is a convenient way of showing upper 
bounds on s, and we use it in the proof immediately following. 
In the other standard approach one produces a (generally transfinite) sequence 
of members of L as follows: f,, is set to be the least member of L. For an ordinal 
cx, f,, , is set to be f(f,), and for a limit ordinal A, fA is set to be V ~ < Ja. This 
sequence is increasing. The limit of the sequence, V ,f,, is the least fixed point of 
f, and the fixed point is attained at some first ordinal, the closure ordinal of f. This 
yields another method of proof: by transfinite induction. If it can be shown that 
each member of the f, sequence has some property, then the least fixed point s 
also has that property. We use this technique also in the proof below. 
Theorem 9.1. The operator T,& is anti-monotonic in the 5, ordering, but is mono- 
tonic in the <,+ ordering. 
PROOF. Suppose ui I, v2. By the previous proposition, 9’ is antimonotonic in its 
second argument, so 
%7@G(u1)~~z) 05$I%J1)~u1)~ 
Since q&<u,I is a lixed point of (A\xM”(x, vi>, this yields 
Y&IC+,)~~2) 5Y&(u1)* 
Since !l$Ju2) is a least fixed point of (hx)X&Ax, u2), under I, , it follows from one 
of the proofs of the Knaster-Tarski theorem that 
%(uz) GYxr%). 
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This establishes the first part of Theorem 9.1. 
Now suppose vi sk u2. We will show ‘J$(ui) sk ‘P&(v,). To this end we define 
two transfinite sequences of valuations, a, and b,, as follows: a, = b, is the always 
false valuation, the least in the st ordering; a,, 1 = q9(a,, u,) and b,, 1 = 
?&b,, u,). Finally, for a limit ordinal A, uA = V LI < ,,un and b, = V LI < *bcl. Both 
sequences are increasing in the sr ordering since ?&, is monotone in its first 
argument. The a, sequence has ‘4$Aui) as its limit, while the b, sequence has 
?&<u,> as its limit, so to prove the second assertion of the theorem it is enough to 
establish that a, --<k b, for every ordinal (Y. 
If (Y = 0, a, and b, are the same; this case is trivial. 
Suppose a, sk b,. Then urr+i = *&a,,~,> --<k*P(bo!,u2) = b,+,, using the 
monotonicity of ‘3!p in both arguments, under sk . 
Finally, suppose urr & b, for every LY < A. It follows that V a < *ua 4, V b a<h a, 
using the fact that Z;r(&%‘) satisfies the infinitary interlacing conditions. q 
With this theorem shown, the existence of a smallest fixed point s$ and a 
biggest fixed point S&, for *A, under the sk ordering, follows immediately from 
the Knaster-Tarski theorem. Thus we have established Theorem 9.2: 
Theorem 9.2. The operator *& has a smallest fixed point, denoted by s!J,, and a 
greatest jixed point, denoted by Si, under the sk ordering. 
The next result is now shown by a simple calculation. 
Theorem 9.4. Every stable valuation is a model. That is, every fied point of 9; is also 
a jixed point of QP. 
PROOF. Suppose s is a hxed point of ?&. Then 
cpp(s) =qp(s,s) =*~(*&(s),s)=*&(s) =s. 0 
We omit the proof of Theorem 9.5, which essentially amounts to applying the 
Knaster-Tarski argument to the monotonic operator f ‘. Using the theorem, 
however, the existence of the two extreme oscillation points s$ and S_& follows 
immediately. Before continuing with results from Section 9, we need a proposition 
and a few lemmas leading up to it. 
Lemma. In a distributive biluttice, x = (x A I ) @ (x V I >, and also false @ true = I . 
PROOF. 
(XA _L)@(xV _L)=[x@(xV 1)] A[I @(XV 1)] 
=[(x63x)V(x@1)]A[(I@x)V(I@1)] 
=[xVx] A[xV I] 
=xA(xV I) 
X. 
For the second part, false I, _L since false is the smallest member of the bilattice 
under the I, ordering. Then using the interlacing conditions, which hold in any 
distributive bilattice, 
false C3 true St I 8 true = _L . 
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Similarly I I, true, so 
I =fulse 8 I I, false @true. 0 
Incidentally, there are three more equations like false 8 true = I that hold in 
distributive bilattices: false 6~ true = T ; I A T = false; and I V T = true. These 
have similar proofs, but we do not need them here. 
Lemma. In a distributive bilattice, if a sr b I, c, then the following hold: 
(1) (aA 1)8(cV _L)lk I; 
(2) (UV I)@csk b; 
(3) Car\ L)@(CA I)& b. 
PROOF. Since I sk false, by the interlacing conditions, a A I sk a A false = false. 
Similarly, c V I sk true. Then, again by the interlacing conditions, (a A I) @ (c v 
I> sk false 0 true. In any distributive bilattice, false 8 true = I . This establishes 
part 1. 
Next, using the hypothesis and interlacing, (a V J-1 63 c sk (a V b) Q c = b Q c 
sk b. 
Finally,(ar\ J_)@kA I)s,(aA I)@(cAb)=(aA I)@bbk b. 0 
Finally, the result we chiefly need: 
Proposition. Zn a distributive bilattice, if a st b I, c then a @ c sk b. 
PROOF. Using the lemmas above and interlacing, 
a8c=[(aAI)G3(aV1)]@c 
=[@A I)CQc] @[(aV J_)Sc] 
s&a A I) @cc] @b 
=[(aAI)@((cAI)@(cV1))]@b 
= [(u A I) 8 (c A L)] CB [(u A I) @(c V 1)] @b 
<kbfBI$b 
=b. 0 
REMARK. The proposition above is really one of four related results. Using a 
similar proof and appropriate versions of the lemmas preceding, the following can 
also be shown: 
l if a I, b <I c, then b sk a @ c; 
l if a sk b sk c, then a A c I, b; 
l if a sk b sk c, then b I, a tic. 
We will need these items later on. Now to return to results from Section 9. 
Theorem 9.7. The valuations s&, @ S$ and s$ CB S$ are both jked points of V$,, and 
hence are stable models. 
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PROOF. Using monotonicity of q& in the sk ordering, 
and then by the antimonotonicity of q& in the I, ordering, 
s; qI$?& 8 s&J I, Sk. 
Now by the previous proposition, 
s&As~Ik~z&A3S~). 
This proves half of the theorem; the other half has a dual proof. 0 
Theorem 9.8. The extremal fixed points of 9; under sk can be calculated from the 
extremal oscillation points under I, as follows: 
(1) s; = s; @ S$; 
(2) s; = s& Cl3 s;. 
PROOF. The valuation s& is the least fixed point of q& in the sk ordering. 
Theorem 9.7 showed that s& 8 S$ is a fixed point, hence 
s& s$@S$. 
In the other direction, s&, and S$ are extremal oscillation points in the I, 
ordering, but s$, being a fixed point, is trivially an oscillation point. Hence 
s$ zzt s; 2, Sk 
and it follows from the earlier proposition that 
s;ss&?r, s;. 
This is half of the theorem. Once again, the other half is dual. q 
Next, a result about monotone mappings in general, before we return to Section 
9. 
Proposition. If f is a monotone mapping on the complete lattice L, then f and f 2 have 
the same least and greatest fixed points. 
PROOF. We show the result for least fixed points; the other half has a dual proof. 
Let a be the least fixed point of f, and let b be the least fixed point of f 2. 
Since every fixed point of f is also a fixed point of f 2, f 2(a> = a. Since b is the 
least fixed point of f 2, b 5 a. 
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If x is a fixed point of f2, so is f(x), because f2(~((x>> =f(f’<x>> =f(x>. Then 
f(b) is a fixed point of f2, and since b is the least fixed point of f2, b <f(b). By 
monotonicity, f(b) <f2(b), or f(b) <b. Since a is the least fixed point of f, it 
follows that a I b. q 
Now we continue with results from Section 9. 
Theorem 9.9. 
(1) s;=s~r\g& 
(2) s; = s; v s;. 
PROOF. The mapping ?A is monotone in the sk ordering, with sg and S$ as its 
least and greatest ied points in this ordering. Trivially, (‘J!“)2 is also monotone in 
this ordering, and by the proposition above it has the same least and greatest fixed 
points. However, (q’)’ is also monotone in the I, ordering, with s&, and S$ as its 
least and greatest fixed points in this ordering. Now, 
s$JLS$&r~, 
hence 
(*&)2(&As$) <,(%J)“($) =s$? 
and, similarly, 
(*&)‘($ As;) I, s$, 
so 
Then since s$, is the least fixed point of <q$J2 in the I, ordering, 
S&It s;r\s;. 
Further, since s& is a fixed point of <‘JJ$,)~, and s$ and S$ are the least and 
greatest fixed points of this operator in the I, ordering, 
s: Ik s; Ik s; 
and it follows by an earlier remark that 
s~AS$<, s$. 0 
For the remaining results, recall that a member x of a bilattice with conflation is 
consistent if x Ik -x, and that a consistent program is one in which program 
bodies do not contain @ and contain only consistent members of 5%‘. 
Theorem 9.11. If 9 is a consistent program, s$ and Sk are consistent in the space of 
valuations. 
PROOF. The first thing we need is that if L@ is a consistent program, !I$. maps 
consistent valuations to consistent valuations. We begin with some background. 
Consistent valuations are those that are consistent in the bilattice of valuations. 
Equivalently, they are the valuations that map ground atoms to consistent mem- 
bers of ~8’. It is shown in [12] (Proposition 3.6) that the consistent members of a 
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bilattice meeting the conditions we are assuming contain false and are closed 
under negation and both finitary and infinitary versions of A, V , and 8. More can 
be said than this, but it is all we need here. 
It follows from what was just said that if u is a consistent valuation and B is a 
ground formula built up from atoms and consistent members of 9, using A, V, 
7, 3, V, and @, then u(B) will be a consistent member of 9. It follows that if ~3’ 
is a consistent program and v and w are consistent valuations, then TY(u,w) is a 
consistent valuation. 
Next, assume w is a consistent valuation. q&(w) is the least fixed point, in the 
I, ordering, of the monotone operator (hx)‘I~Jx, w). One approximates to this 
least lixed point via a transfinite sequence of steps. The initial member, the always 
false valuation, is consistent. If stage (Y yields a consistent valuation, so will stage 
(Y + 1, by the previous paragraph. At limit ordinals we use the sup operation, which 
in this case is the infinitary version of v , and the collection of consistent members 
is closed under this operation. It follows that every member of the transfinite 
sequence is consistent, and hence T&,(w) is consistent. Thus 9’ does map 
consistent valuations to consistent valuations. 
The valuation s$ is the least fixed point, in the I, ordering, of the monotone 
operator <‘I$J2. By the preceding paragraph, if ~5’ is a consistent program, (*A)’ 
maps consistent valuations to consistent valuations. Then, again, every member of 
the transfinite sequence of approximations to the least fixed point of it will be 
consistent, hence so will s&,. The result about Sk can be shown by a dual 
argument. q 
Corollary 9.12. Suppose 9 is a consistent program, and the well-founded model s$ is 
exact. Then it is the unique stable model. 
PROOF. If ~3’ is a consistent program, s$ is consistent, and so s$, sk - s$. If s& is 
exact, si = -s$. Now, s& sk s&, since s.$ = s&, Q Sk. Then -s& sk - si and it 
follows, under the present assumptions, that s$ sk s.$ Hence s!$ = s&. 
In a similar way, s$ = S$. Then also, Si = s& &, S$ = si @ si = s$. Since all 
stable models lie between sg and S$,, there is only one stable model. q 
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